Systematic review of features for co‐simulating security incidents in Cyber‐Physical Systems by Czekster, Ricardo M. et al.
Received: 22 April 2020 Revised: 15 December 2020 Accepted: 16 January 2021 Published on: 20 February 2021
DOI: 10.1002/spy2.150
S U R V E Y PA P E R
Systematic review of features for co-simulating security
incidents in Cyber-Physical Systems
Ricardo M. Czekster1 Charles Morisset1 John A. Clark2
Sadegh Soudjani1 Charalampos Patsios3 Peter Davison3
1School of Computing, Newcastle
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
2Department of Computer Science, The
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
3School of Engineering, Newcastle
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Correspondence
Ricardo M. Czekster, School of
Computing, Newcastle University,
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
Email: ricardo.melo-czekster@ncl.ac.uk
Funding information
Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council, Grant/Award Number:
EP/V012053/1
Abstract
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and Internet-of-Things (IoT) plus energy are the
enabling technology of modern power systems also known as the Smart Grid
(SG). A SG may consist of thousands of interconnected components communi-
cating and exchanging data across layers that stretch beyond technical capabili-
ties, for instance, markets and customer interactions. Cyber-physical security is
a major source of concern due to the high reliance of the SG on Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) and their widespread use. Addressing secu-
rity requires developing modeling and simulation tools that approximate and
replicate adversarial behavior in the SG. These tools have in fact two simulators,
one handling continuous power flows and another for capturing the discrete
behavior when communicating across CPS or IoT components. The technique
of composing two models of computation in a global simulation of these coupled
systems is called co-simulation. Although there are many frameworks and tools
for co-simulation, the set of features for modeling cyber-physical security inci-
dents in the SG lacks thorough understanding. We present a systematic review
of features and tools for co-simulating these concerns in CPS. We also highlight
and discuss research gaps with respect to the most used tools in industry and
academia and comment on their relevant features.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are the combined use of physical and digital counterparts to enhance decision making
capabilities. It is an innovative concept applied to modern infrastructures for incorporating intelligent data gathering
mechanisms, sensing, and feedback loops to support decisions. CPS are likely to be of interest to companies such as those
offering services in water, energy, and transportation sectors. In the long term, CPS will assist the seamless integration of
data and systems into its underlying infrastructure.
An example of CPS in the energy domain is one which focuses on efficient energy use where customers are brought
into the decision making process. In this context, a Smart Grid (SG) is an example of CPS. A SG encompasses a large
range of equipment, physical components and systems operating and exchanging data. At its core, pervasive Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) ensure reliable and secure pathways for end-to-end communication. Notable
components of the SG are Internet of Things (IoT) devices, Building Management Systems (BMS), Heating, Ventilation,
and Air Conditioning (HVAC), and Electric Vehicles (EV), to mention a few.
CPS combine physical and digital components across multiple scales whereas IoT operates on the transmission
layer. Examples are power and telecommunication networks connecting smart buildings and telecommunication devices
attached to the physical infrastructure. When deployed in smart contexts they are responsible for sensing the environ-
ment and monitoring its surroundings, among other features. The CPS infrastructure performs the remote management
of its underlying components for energy efficiency, comfort, and reasonable use of resources.
Unfortunately, among the many challenges discouraging broad adoption of CPS across society is the lack of security,
privacy, and trust. Security of the SG, when poorly addressed, cascades into more instability across systems, often leading
to outages or blackouts. Critical infrastructures such as the SG expose a large attack surface for malicious interventions
caused by adversaries, with potential to inflict severe financial and safety damages. Reasons of attacks are for example
simplified access to ICT, poorly maintained systems, malware, or lax security measures, to mention a few. High pro-
file security related events include the Stuxnet worm in the Iranian nuclear program facilities1 and the attack on the
Ukrainian power grid.2
A technique to investigate cyber-physical security in critical infrastructures such as the SG is simulation. It is often
used to test designs and artificially create analysis scenarios to ease quantitative assessments. Analysts simulate the
power grid, the transmission network, or the telecommunication network using different simulation engines. So, it is
crucial for these simulators to accurately synchronize among each other. The approach responsible for merging two
or more simulation engines into one global simulation representing the dynamics of these coupled systems is called
co-simulation.3 Present work investigates co-simulation engines with focus on security aspects, exploring situations as
diverse as power theft, telecommunication delays, impact of attacks on components, and the interaction between these
two core elements in SG research.
1.1 Motivation
There is a myriad of co-simulation frameworks and tools for addressing major CPS concerns and shortcomings. However,
these software suites are designed to function as general-purpose solutions. They provide a wide range of modeling pos-
sibilities but fall short on focus, making it hard to leverage other concerns altogether. For instance, to model aspects such
as security, they must modify pre-existing tools and customize the models to meet their objectives, which significantly
impair timely assessments.
There is a need to understand the modeling features of tools addressing key SG components and their underlying
systems. It is equally crucial to model and simulate security incidents in power settings to test designs and compute the
impact of cyber-physical attacks on the infrastructure. We have thoroughly assessed previous work and scientific literature
and we discovered no systematic reviews pointing out modeling features focusing on security aspects when co-simulating
the SG. Our work here also aims to show modelers the limitations and advantages of modeling and co-simulating the SG,
exposing most used tools and features to address cyber-physical security concerns.
1.2 Contribution
Our contribution is to conduct and present a Systematic Literature Review (SLR)4 describing the main features of
co-simulation frameworks for cyber-physical security of CPS, notably the SG. The focus here is toward power and
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telecommunication issues such as harmful drops in power voltage, network latency, and problems arising in data
communication shortcomings caused by malicious adversaries.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we list most used co-simulation frameworks adopted in both academia and industry,
and second, we describe and discuss the key features for selected work retrieved by the SLR. We have identified the most
likely targets and assets in the SG context and discussed the existing trade-offs.
1.3 Organization
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses energy issues in the SG, simulation techniques, and related work
whereas Section 3 presents the SLR’s details and extracted features, discussing surveyed papers. Section 4 concludes the
work with suggestions for further research.
2 POWER GRIDS AND CO-SIMULATION
Due to sheer dependence on energy throughout society, inherent technologies have shifted from traditional centralized
Generation, Transmission and Distribution (GT&D) infrastructures to decentralized smaller scale topologies strongly
coupled with ICT. There is also a push toward the installation of renewable energy generation mechanisms in buildings
and households, which may reduce peak demand and promote carbon neutral environments in these settings. Power
disruptions have a large impact on human activity in general as they may cause serious economic or damage even for
short time periods.
The SG depends on an information and communication layer responsible for reliable and secure data exchanges over a
high number of components. The idea is to increase power grid efficiency through better distribution and management of
energy, adjusting peak demand, and energy prices dynamically while interoperating across heterogeneous devices. How-
ever, the large scale nature of the SG makes them highly susceptible to failures caused by misuse, wrong configurations,
incidents, attacks, or poor maintenance. It is worth remarking that the technological prospects and advances present in
the SG effectively bring substantial benefits to customers, users, and managers.
In terms of energy generation, Distributed Energy Resources (DER) embedded in the distribution system function as
scattered assets for coping with additional flexible demand or generation. A contractually increase in deployment of DER
in the infrastructure will help transitioning toward low carbon operations and to offset significant decreases in centralized
generation. Other SG elements encompass Distributed Generation (DG), Energy Storage Systems (ESS), and Demand
Side Management (DSM). ESS are used to store energy generated by solar panels or wind turbines (to mention a few)
whereas DSM employs customer-based incentives such as dynamic pricing or behavioral changes to reduce or increase
power in the grid while keeping frequency within nominal boundaries.5
SG faces challenges affecting a wide range of stakeholders, from power operators to managers. Examples of problems
are (i) intermittent behavior of renewable energy (eg, uncertainty in generation due to weather); (ii) frequency regula-
tion and responses to variable power demands; (iii) infected software executing in CPS, IoT, or controllers that introduces
vulnerabilities into other components, propagating malware (computer viruses), corrupting data, capturing wrong situ-
ational information (state estimation) or relaying spurious/inconsistent network packets; (iv) energy based controllers
must cope with device heterogeneity at a large scale; and (v) uncertainties produced when dealing with dynamic energy
markets and customer incentives to balance supply and demand.
Figure 1 shows an adaptation of the SG architecture proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST, in the US) depicting its major infrastructure, sub-systems, and participants.6,7 Security is required across the
infrastructure as disturbances and delays may cause damage or financial loss to stakeholders or wrongly switch energy
prices to customers.
2.1 Co-simulation and related work
Co-simulation is essential in power and telecommunication networks because it provides results that closely approxi-
mate the behaviors of large scale complex networks.8 It allows the definition of multiple scenarios in the SG and attracts
large interest in academia and industry.9 It has mechanisms for artificially incorporating user or component patterns for
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F I G U R E 1 Overview of NIST’s SG architecture showing power GT&D and sub-systems6
investigating and addressing impact on infrastructures. Depending on the tool, one could model user behaviors and appli-
ance actions (namely scheduling), household and building properties (related to energy conservation, for example, using
employing double-glazed windows), and consider different weather conditions.
In terms of open-source tools, OMNeT++,10 and adevs are general purpose discrete event simulators used in academia
and industry.11 For network simulation there is wide acceptance of ns, Network Simulator (ns-2 or ns-3).12 Another
example is INET (a networking simulator used with OMNeT++) and OPNET,13 employed for performance and network
behavior (note that OPNET Modeler is proprietary). There is a wealth of relevant work in analysis studying the impact
of attacks specifically in telecommunications. For example, SEA++ is a framework written in OMNeT++/INET14 where
authors have proposed a high-level Attack Specification Language to help modelers define and consider attacks in the
network level.
Tackling power GT&D involves the numerical solution of linear equations thus many tools have been proposed over
the years. For generation, MATPOWER15 solves power equations with MATLAB whereas Powerflow (proprietary) com-
putes load flows for 10 to 10 k electrical buses. Other known proprietary tools include PowerWorld, a visual approach to
power simulation, and the Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) equipped with real-time simulation.
Specialized CPS require proper analysis methods to guarantee data consistency in the presence of combined power
and telecommunication challenges in large scale systems. Palensky et al16 discussed six dimensions to advance the under-
standing of SG combined with modeling and simulation: (i) realistic topologies; (ii) data flow and concurrency; (iii)
simultaneously tackling multiple events happening in the infrastructure; (iv) issues related to variable structure dynam-
ics, that is, situations where CPS enable/disable/alter parts, influencing other systems; (v) modeling language, offering
initialization, incremental modeling, reuse and readability; and (vi) scalability issues.
For simulating power at the distribution level, GridLAB-D17 employs agent based simulation for house ther-
mal models, appliances, power distribution feeders, and scheduling configurations. OpenDSS18 simulates distribution
power systems and models multiple DER whereas EnergyPlus19 (free) is used to address complex building power
flows with different materials. It is worth mentioning that the latter is also equipped with co-simulation capabili-
ties. The SGSim framework combines OMNeT++ and OpenDSS into one solution for distribution power networks20
with a visual interface. A proprietary tool called Power System Simulator (PSS) addresses transmission and distri-
bution. A similar tool is DIgSILENT PowerFactory (proprietary), a real time simulation engine for large distribution
networks.21
An example of a general purpose co-simulation framework is Mosaik22 (written in Python) employing PYPOWER
for optimal power load computation. Another project worth noticing is the Global Event-driven Co-simulation plat-
form (GECO).23 It combines the Positive Sequence Load Flow (PSLF) tool with the Network Simulator version 2 (ns-2).
One co-simulation tool that offers a model-based approach is the Integrated tool chain for model-based design of CPS
(INTO-CPS).24
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We also mention the Cyber physical co-simulation platform for Distributed Energy Resources in SG (CyDER),25
developed to function as a modular co-simulation framework for multiple DER and their interaction with stakehold-
ers. Puerto et al26 provided a similar approach with the Zero OBvious Node Link co-simulator (ZerOBNL) employing
pandapower27 in a partitioned approach, where modeling elements are divided into more manageable parts to ease
analysis efforts. More recently, Morstyn et al28 presented a framework called the Open Platform for Energy Networks
(OPEN) for modeling and simulating SG elements with examples consisting of EV and Energy Management Systems
(EMS) interaction.
In terms of defending Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Nazir et al compiled a comprehen-
sive list of vulnerabilities.29 Other surveys and systematic reviews tackled CPS, IoT, power, and the SG.30,31,32,33,34 Work
on security and privacy of SG discussed location obfuscation techniques, corrupt data detection algorithms, cloud net-
work data security, privacy preservation, and mobile user data privacy.35 Kundur et al36 proposed a cyber attack impact
analysis using graphs for the SG. The authors discussed the importance of plausibility and severity of vulnerabilities and
attacks in coupled networks.
There is also an increasing interest in developing testbeds for analyzing SG designs and addressing cyber-physical
security concerns.37 The idea is to devise realistic settings that closely maps the actual infrastructure, energy loads, and
telecommunication patterns to assess problems and trade-offs on alternative scenarios. Ashok et al38 devised a domain
specific testbed for investigating design shortcomings and training stakeholders to better respond to grid situations.
Another research developed the SCEPTRE toolchain,39 a virtualized (on-line) approach considering multiple DER that
focuses on telecommunication latencies.
Tesfatsion et al40 developed the Agent based Modeling of Electricity Systems (AMES) for modeling Transactive Energy
Systems (TES) that approximate the energy market to customers and wholesale/retail suppliers as well as different design
options. In the same direction, researchers have devised the Transactive Energy Simulation platform (TESP)41 and the
ITD-TES Platform.42 TESP aggregates other tools and provides a framework that integrates buildings (using Energy-
Plus), households and weather (GridLAB-D), and allows the integration with so called “agents” that may be attached
to the co-simulation. ITD-TES considers Integrated Transmission & Distribution (ITD) systems and an environment to
test transactive designs according to sets of strategies (eg, centralized vs distributed approaches for energy bidding and
committing).
2.2 Desired co-simulation features for security
A considerable body of work exists on broad aspects of cyber-physical security tackling different dimensions,43,44,45,46,8,6
as well as a survey of surveys about these issues.47 Research gaps highlighted in these surveys include: (1) modeling inci-
dent responses and impact in co-simulation frameworks; (2) easy to read and interchangeable format for representing
security incidents; (3) simulation of cascading attacks (or chain failures) and their effects on the infrastructure; (4) data
obtained from security based testbeds (used as parameters to models) from real-world architectures addressing attacks or
instabilities; (5) studying the system-wide effects of incidents over wide-areas impacting energy GT&D as well as telecom-
munication networks; and (6) corrupted data transmission across the ICT infrastructure (from different sources with
replay or data injection attacks) and impacts on system-level decisions to balance energy supply and demand.
Governmental stakeholders must ensure reasonable service reliability by regulating energy infrastructure providers.
The focus is on the use of policies and techniques to accommodate traditional threats such as weather or climate related,
equipment failures, attacks, accidental damages, or human errors in representative models. The US Department of Energy
(DoE) has proposed a Vulnerability Assessment Process (VAP) in the Infrastructure Assurance Outreach Program48 con-
sisting of nine steps: (1) evaluate threat environment; (2) information network architecture assessment (eg, SCADA and
EMS); (3) penetration testing of information systems; (4) physical security assessment; (5) operations security assess-
ment; (6) review administrative procedures and policies; (7) Physical asset analysis; (8) impact analysis; and (9) risk
characterization.
With respect to the assessment proposed by the US DoE, there is a need to consider different types of threats (#1),
architectures (#2), across multiple types of physical equipment (#4, #7), distinct operational aspects (#5, #6), impact
analysis (#8), and risk characterization (#9). Penetration testing is out of the scope of modeling and simulation because
it is usually addressed after the system is physically operational.
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The VAP (from #1 to #9) is mapped as follows:
• Types of threats (#1): (a) Agent: terrorism, financial, criminal, nonmalicious user; (b) Market: exposure of the
transactive energy market; (c) Asset: elements belonging to the infrastructure, systems, devices, sensors, DER, ESS,
servers;
• Different architectures (#2): Handle scalability (different magnitudes, geographically dispersed entities), continuity (of
services, power provision), complexity, flexibility, heterogeneity (vendors, suppliers, equipment, devices, components);
• Physical equipment (#4, #7): (a) Quantitatively show the harmful effects of cascading failures as disruptions in key
components that may influence the service level in the grid; (b) Uncertainty and variability in energy load (intermittent
behavior); (c) Representing different granularity for devices, appliances, and components;
• Operational aspects (#5, #6): (a) Deal with the needs and expectations of stakeholders in the short/long term planning;
(b) Involve stakeholders in communications and power networks; (c) Define energy test feeders to address possible
configurations and loads; (d) Adjust the level of monitoring and control; (e) Capture social/behavioral aspects of so
called prosumers and dynamic energy pricing; (f) Model mitigation strategies and coordination of responses in the
event of incidents or service interruptions; (g) Adjust maintenance options through modeling;
• Undertaking impact analysis (#8): (a) Impact on market and system operations affected by attacks; (b) System impacts
on reliability and costs;
• Risk assessment (#9): (a) Characterization of the value and importance of assets; (b) Comparison and evaluations;
The target audience for these integrated systems are network and power managers (working together in a joint control
operations room), ICT administrators, infrastructure owners, aggregators, suppliers/vendors, and solution developers
working on applications to assist SG management. Timescale is another important aspect as operators may be interested
in planning energy demands in the long term whereas building managers may be concerned with daily needs, adjusting
supply/demand accordingly.
We highlight crucial characteristics with respect to the security spectrum of desired functions to embed into
co-simulators:
• Integration of continuous and discrete simulations capturing interaction between power and telecommunication;
• Simple to use interface for designing scenarios and assigning parameters to define multiple heterogeneous targets;
• Reasonable modeling abstraction of the reality in terms of topological features, offering different level-of-detail (for
various audiences);
• Helpful to stakeholders working across planning, maintenance or decision making in different time scales and
objectives (short or long term);
• Work with different energy profiles across buildings, houses, commerce, and industry;
One could better exemplify co-simulation modeling characteristics by aligning desired features with security require-
ments:
• Tackling incidents in general, that is, attacks, accidents, malicious behaviors;
• Definition of events: incidents (what?), locations (where?), list of affected equipment (who?), service dependencies,
with a timestamp or scheduling of events happening (when?). Modelers may instantiate types of events, for example,
single, multiple, or synchronized events across the infrastructure;
• Assigning thresholds and addressing the consequences of incidents, for example, which device or stakeholder is
affected;
• Use of alarms and triggers that are activated when reaching predefined threshold values;
• Interoperability among co-simulators: (i) seamless transformation across co-simulators with similar characteristics;
(ii) modelers may select target platform to match incidents described in the model;
We list below a summary of desired features of simulators for security.49-65
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3 CO-SIMULATION FEATURES FOR MODELING CYBER-PHYSICAL
SECURITY
Researchers use SLRs to select key work and evaluate research gaps and venues for pursuing neglected investigation
paths.4 We present next our literature review identifying tools for co-simulating security incidents and extracting features
from the frameworks. Our research question was “What features are needed in a tool in order to simulate security
incidents in Cyber-Physical Systems?” The review protocol focused on the following scientific resources: (1) Google
Scholar; (2) ACM Digital Library; (3) IEEE Xplore; and (4) Scopus between January/2009 and December/2019.
As exclusion criteria we disregarded papers: (i) failing to address the physical part of CPS in conjunction with network
communications; (ii) having simulation tools described only as related work, not as the main paper’s objective; and (iii)
with research not tackling security incidents or physical/integrity concerns, for example, where adversaries are only using
telecommunication networks. The search string used to retrieve documents was:
( ("simulation" OR "co-simulation") AND
("tools" OR "framework" OR "software") AND
("security" OR "incident"OR "attack" OR "vulnerability") AND
("cyber-physical system" OR "CPS" OR "smart" OR "infrastructure") )
The inclusion criteria selected work that has used simulation or co-simulation with focus on cyber-physical secu-
rity, safety, and incidents in CPS (it may be related to Advanced Metering Infrastructure—AMI—or similar technologies)
using power and network telecommunication in a coupled mechanism. We excluded work that: (i) it concerned low level
domain application (eg, work on hardware aspects and internals of Phasor Measurement Unit [PMU], smart meters or
smart cards); (ii) addressed only physical security issues in power systems (eg, transient voltages) instead of cyber con-
cerns; (iii) employed other technologies for communication; iv) did not detail communication network parameters; v)
used game based, Monte Carlo Simulation, Dynamic Systems, Linear Programming, or optimization techniques; (vi) pub-
lished a poster or short paper (up to four pages); were (vii) patents; (viii) theoretical frameworks; or (ix) proofs of concept.
The data extraction and reporting phase will list bibliographical details, toolchains, or auxiliary tools, offered features
for modeling and simulating security incidents, and tool integration details for coupled power and telecommunication
networks, and scalability.
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3.1 Extracted features from selected literature
We queried the list of scientific libraries using our search string. Then, we applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria
in the yielded results, which resulted in selecting 15 papers for deeper inspection (identified next by the # symbol). For
these results we extracted their main features and tools for simulating cyber-physical security incidents in CPS.
[#01]: Chinnow et al50 extended an auxiliary tool called NeSSi66 for their simulation needs. They used a multi-platform
solution combining Java with InterPSS67 to model and simulate the power network. They presented a simple case study
and an evaluation of data corruption attacks for AMI. They considered data issues for a case study that represented two
attack scenarios: (1) Falsely Reporting Low Consumption; and (2) Falsely Reporting Low Prices. Both attacks influenced
the energy market prices with wrong information simulated via the auxiliary tools where they measure the impact of data
alterations over the infrastructure. They modeled attacks by different adversary types, for example, outsiders, homeown-
ers, and by an energy provider employee. It employed a supporting tool called NeSSi2, implemented as a security-oriented
framework.
[#02]: The Attack Simulation TOolset for Smart GRid InfrAstructures (ASTORIA) by Wermann et al60 used
co-simulation to evaluate and analyze the impact of malicious attacks in SG components. It described a framework where
modelers can specify customized topologies to build realistic simulation scenarios. ASTORIA used three auxiliary tools:
PYPOWER, ns-3, and Mosaik. It offered the capability of modeling security attacks and incidents in the SG.
[#03]: Gupta and Akhtar34 made a survey on frameworks, tools and security issues of smart power grids. It cited power
and networking simulators, discussing strengths and weaknesses. The authors described simulation models and address
how one may combine tools in a co-simulation.
[#04]: The paper by Sgouras et al68 addressed attacks on AMI using realistic grid topologies. The authors analyzed the
impact of Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) on power distribution’s reliability. A power
simulator was not used, however, this work is relevant to discussions about AMI related security shortcomings. As a
result, the authors state that DDoS attacks over critical peak hours increase interruption probability due to unavailability
of Demand Response (DR) controlled loads. The authors used an auxiliary tool called realistic simulation environments
(ReaSE)69 to generate realistic data traffic patterns of common communication protocols. Other auxiliary tools were
OMNeT++ and INET.
[#05]: Queiroz et al. (2011)65 described a framework for SCADA based simulations, helping modelers test the effects
of malicious attacks and evaluate security. It used OMNeT++ and INET and an auxiliary tool for designing network
topologies called NED. For power simulation it connected to a MATLAB/Simulink model using SimPowerSystems for
representation of a wind farm of six wind turbines connected to a 25 kV distribution system.
[#06]: The Cyber-Physical Security Assessment (CPSA) by Saxena et al62 used co-simulation to identify vulnera-
ble states allowing control center operators to devise countermeasures to mitigate disruption in the physical layer. For
co-simulation, the tool employed auxiliary tools such as GridSim, MATLAB, Matlabcontrol (Java to MATLAB), Power-
World, and JADE (Java to PowerWorld). It presented a graphical interface for modelers detailing the communication
among different smart components, logging, and contingency analysis. The tool major stakeholders were control center
operators, where they may create responses in security assessments yielded back by their simulator. The authors have dis-
cussed and implemented interesting features, however, the network communication missed significant details (eg, they
have used GridSim for a limited topology). They ended the work by discussing how the tool may be used for training
operators to react to potential cyber-attacks in power systems.
[#07]: Tundis et al49 focused on attack scenario modeling in critical infrastructures. The objective was to identify unex-
pected behavior, anomalies, and vulnerabilities. The authors implemented a Smart Grid Simulator for experimentation
and validation of the approach in a realistic case study. Attack simulation complemented testing and validation phases of
the SG defining attacks, scenarios, and targets with a reasonable amount of detail. The drawbacks are that it is proprietary
and no power or network auxiliary tool was employed for the analysis.
[#08]: Babu et al70 characterized attack data in high fidelity datasets with close interactions among physical and cyber
communications in SG using PowerWorld. The authors produced a case study using a Network Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (NIDS), focused on monitors that could identify attacks from previous signatures and differentiate them from regular
traffic. They have presented a six-step attack plan to shut down two generators in the grid, mapping the network topology
with the power topology to inspect which components were being affected.
[#09]: Pan et al55 have combined DIgSILENT PowerFactory, OMNeT++, and MATLAB in a co-simulation. The focus
of the work was on data attacks targeted at EMS and a vulnerability assessment framework. It discussed attackers gaining
access to measurement data such as: (i) on Remote Terminal Unit (RTU; containing power flow measurements that are
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sent to SCADA servers); (ii) on the communication network; and (iii) on the master server. Such large scale systems are
usually equipped with alarms that are triggered through a scheme known as Bad Data Detection (BDD), activated when
measurements exceed a threshold (eg, inaccurate data or failing RTU). The work focused on specific components such
as RTU, communication network, and SCADA controllers. It discussed how attackers may deflect detection by inserting
measurement data to influence the BDD scheme. As drawbacks, the co-simulation did not detail the impact attacks in
the SG nor the used parameters and topologies.
[#10]: Genge and Siaterlis61 described an experimental framework for modeling and simulation of the SG, allowing
scenario exploration for understanding the impact of cyber attacks in the infrastructure. The authors have used MatDyn
(integrated with Simulink) for the power simulator and Emulab71 (an emulation testbed with arbitrary topology genera-
tion and other features suitable for realistic network flows) for simulating the communication network. It discussed the
harmful effects of voltage oscillations due to synchronized attacks showing results per power bus in the grid topology.
[#11]: The paper describes the Transactive Energy Security Simulation Testbed (TESST) by Zhang et al,72 a testbed
for simulating cyber attacks in energy pricing. The authors have used PYPOWER, GridLAB-D, ns-3, and EnergyPlus
for modeling transmission, distribution, telecommunication, and buildings, respectively. Transactive energy markets are
decentralized models where end-users play active roles in managing energy consumption and generation that influences
electricity pricing. The authors have extended the TESP where they have incorporated security concerns. The paper
discussed how DoS attacks may influence pricing due to information unavailability or delays between end-points.
[#12]: Moulema et al52 used the Framework for Network Co-Simulation (FNCS),73 a co-simulator integrating
GridLAB-D, MATPOWER, and ns-3. The idea was to create several co-simulation scenarios and study the impact of
attacks. The results offered different ways of analyzing smart meters tackling network, data, and market concerns. It
demonstrated how to build scenarios and how to change network performance and attack parameters and their effects
on power and market.
[#13]: Sridhar and Govindarasu57 were concerned with security applied to the Automatic Generation Control, a fre-
quency control application encompassing a large area responsible for handling power flow and frequency measurements
from remote sensors. The authors have developed a resilient control framework and described mitigation techniques to
maintain system stability. The target for the study was on data integrity attacks, where they have implemented their own
simulator. It focused on modeling adversaries, showing the impact of attacks on frequency.
[#14]: Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia74 have modeled an IEEE 24-bus for Load Altering Attacks. The model did
not consider the networking infrastructure, however, it presented interesting discussions on the effect of attacks in power
grids. Energy managers could choose to protect vulnerable loads or implement a partial load protection scheme. Also, the
paper discussed the cost of protection, a crucial metric for managers when deciding how to defend from attacks.
[#15]: Çetinkaya et al51 addressed research challenges behind security incidents with ns-3. They discussed the main
challenges in large scale networks and major events that impact normal operations. The authors commented on chal-
lenges such as: (i) natural component failures; (ii) misconfigurations; (iii) cable cuts; (iv) jammers; (v) interference; (vi)
weather precipitation; (vii) attack against infrastructure component; (viii) natural disaster; (ix) pandemic; (x) nationwide
Internet outage; (xi) power failure; (xii) electromagnetic pulse attack; and (xiii) coronal mass ejection (eg, solar flares).
They classify intent (nonmalicious or malicious), scope (nodes, links, or area), and domain (wired or wireless).
3.2 Feature analysis
Our SLR focused on co-simulation and modeling features of cyber-physical security incidents. It is worth mentioning that
when tackling data attacks, one could abstract the telecommunication network and emulate data corruption directly at
the component level, for example, by altering measurements. However, for availability attacks, it makes sense to model
the communication infrastructure among participants as delays or malicious injection of packets impacting other portions
of the SG.
Some papers were preselected and then discarded to follow the exclusion criteria. Nevertheless, they offered valuable
features to incorporate into our discussion. For example, Baetens et al75 have modeled a set of electricity feeders according
to the size of their aluminium cables (for IEEE radial distribution 34 Node Test Feeder), categorizing them into strong,
moderate, and weak feeder designs. For realistic simulations one must address electric feeder characteristics because they
influence the power and the incidents that may occur. Table 1 shows an overview of extracted features per paper (from
01 to 15, market with a # symbol).

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CZEKSTER et al. 11 of 20
Attacks aimed at security are directed toward one or more dimensions of the CIA triad: Confidentiality, Integrity, or
Availability (“Non-Repudiation” is out of the scope of this work, that is, the association of actions to unique individuals).
We comment below on the issues addressed in the triad as discussed by Gunduz et al76:
• Confidentiality: papers #05 and #06 tackled Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM). Other attacks were not investigated such as:
traffic analysis, phishing, wiretapping, hijacking (session), social engineering, Domain Name System (DNS) poisoning,
unauthorized access, sniffing, replay/playback, tunneling, scanning, key/certificate replication;
• Integrity: work has considered Physical, Data Integrity/Corruption/Tampering, False Reporting (consumption/prices),
False Data Injection, Bid Price or Quantity manipulation, Buffer overflow and Time delay/synchronization. Mas-
querading was not mentioned. However, it has been used indirectly in market bidding;
• Availability: interest were directed toward DoS/DDoS, Load Altering, Load Drop, Coordinated Load Changing,
Malicious software infection (malware), Jamming (channel), Packet/Message drop/Blackhole. On the other hand,
Spamming, Routing, Wormhole, Teardrop, Smurf, Flooding, and Zero-day attacks were not modeled in the body of
selected work;
We have conducted an analysis in the feature set to identify similar characteristics and to categorizing it according
to attack type, objective, and targeted infrastructure. The features were divided into seven groups (A–G), where G was
sub-divided in eight parts.
• A. Topology (network/power): modeling power and network topology for entire portions (parameter N households)
of the grid, with a mapping from one to another. Automatic generation of ns-3 code according to topology param-
eters. Definition of critical elements within the infrastructure and use of auxiliary tools for topology generation.
Modeling parameters such as number of nodes/edges, degree, clustering, diameter, hop count, and link (bandwidth)
configurations.
• B. Data related: change data or measurements in smart components/devices, corrupting it or changing to maxi-
mize profits or reduce energy costs. Modeling data attacks: Energy Theft or Pushing, component status change, link
disconnection, input/output manipulation, packet dropping/cloning.
• C. Network communication and power related parameters: parameters for telecommunication networks such as topol-
ogy, packet size, delay, propagation delay, dropped messages per time unit, number of connected devices, protocol, and
data rate. It was important to identify network traffic parameters and power measurements as well as control com-
mands. Ability to save data (logging) to serve as evidence of attacks in the infrastructure, so it could be later replayed
for more thorough investigations. Modelers may select the most appropriated test feeder to use in their design as it
directly impacts power behavior among electrical buses in residential, commercial, and industrial areas.
• D. Realistic settings: the system must have the ability to work with realistic network communication flows in normal
and in under attack situations. Also, it should allow to replay traffic and work with real world traces obtained from logs
from utilities or other external datasets. Some authors discussed inserting random (traffic) noise for realistic analysis.
• E. Attacks: attacks were modeled by different aspects of coupled systems. It is worth commenting that some mod-
els considered attacks following timed incursions (schedules), adding control to the analysis, or a randomized
approach happening in any point in simulation time. Types: DoS/DDoS (flooding, buffer overflow), packet spoofing
and MiTM, eavesdropping, malicious software infection (modification of measured data), energy theft, Data Integrity
(False Data Injection attack), Data Availability (jamming), combined attacks (eg, false data with network overflow,
simultaneously), synchronized attacks, load attack, manipulation of bid price and bid quantity, Disabled RTU and
communication delay at a substation, and timed attacks (according to a schedule) Targets: Smart meter, utility server,
substations, hardware, or SCADA components.
• F. Output: investigation of the telecommunication network coupled with power related statistics. For instance, outputs
showing plots with frequencies, power mismatch, energy consumption/generation, oro bidding prices. For commu-
nication, research investigated packet quantities, queue length in routers, and errors. In terms of general output, we
mention number of attacks over time (if attacks are randomized, unscheduled, or uncontrolled).
• G. Modeling features: a reasonable number of extracted features was related to modeling aspects where we have
categorized them as follows:
- G1. Modeling attackers and scenarios: some authors discussed the need to devise attacker profiles to guide their
actions, modeling the attainable attack surface and specific targets. Another interesting feature was to devise
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attack scenarios to ease analysis. Other work focused on defining acceptable thresholds to increase detection
because they could act as alarms for improper use. Authors also discussed how attackers may circumvent
detection by choosing specific transmission patterns for susceptible targets. There were considerable concerns
directed at attack locations and which components were affected.
- G2. Modeling attacker behaviors and defenses: some papers discussed not only attackers, but also defenses to
improve security. They have directed their attention to the set of actions adversaries perform after gaining access
to specific networks, increasing their privileges, protecting data, guaranteeing consistent energy bid prices and
quantities, and on learning and predicting energy demand according to truthful measurements.
- G3. Tackling synchronization: authors have studied the hazardous effects of synchronized incidents to imbalance
frequency regulation. It is caused by installing malicious software into inexpensive CPS or IoT systems that
controls high-wattage devices. The idea is to toggle power on or off to cause damage in frequency destabilization
attempts.
- G4. Targets: foci targeted physical attacks in equipment (hardware) or substations and impact on availability.
When modeling adversaries, simulations must incorporate overloading the network infrastructure (excess
packets) as well as altering meter measurements. Some authors were also concerned on attacks directed at data
servers since they have specific power requirements and may disrupt grid operation in more harmful ways than
common operations.
- G5. Impact analysis: one interesting feature when simulating the SG was the ability to study the impact of
incidents in energy levels, device statistics, and packet traffic. The idea is to evaluate different dimensions in
coupled systems and investigate variations as synchronized attacks may take place.
- G6. Features: one work has addressed the need to devise an extensible library of attacks, which modelers may
extend it to compose more sophisticated incursions. Other interesting features included the computation of
global state estimators, logging data from components, generating forecasts based on historical data, modeling
different challenges of networks as well as incorporating disruption of large parts of telecommunication
networks.
- G7. Interfacing with other components: the idea was to combine internal components’ behaviors and the ability to
generate useful output when communicating with the co-simulation engine. For example, one work developed
ways of providing an interface to connect with SCADA components.
- G8. Baselining: in simulation, it is usual to create a model to base all subsequent comparisons and analysis. By
devising baseline results, modelers may understand and better evaluate the impact of attacks and assess
countermeasures to contain or mitigate attacks in CPS.
3.3 Summary and insights
Three major themes emerged during the SLR for tackling security. Work has focused on (i) physical attacks (directed at
one or multiple targets); (ii) data altering attacks (corrupting monitoring/sensing data or market pricing exchanges); and
(iii) flooding the network with spurious packets (DoS/DDoS). The interplay and coordination effort to deploy effective
operations in CPS involve different stakeholders with distinct objectives. Table 2 relates our features groups across papers
retrieved by the SLR.
We discovered a total of 16 stakeholders across the selected documents. Table 3 shows how each feature group is
related. It is noticeable that the Feature C. (eg, Power/Network parameters) was addressed by all stakeholders.
For security purposes, adversaries aim to disrupt operations, gain access, avoid detection, or tamper data. A wealth of
research has stressed the need to use realistic topologies in networks close to real-world traces as well as incorporating
random traffic noise while communicating. The idea is to have a framework for analyzing future attack patterns where the
infrastructure may counteract or adapt to incidents. Logging plays an instrumental role in simulation because one may
replay the incident and or diminish their harmful effects. It may also be used in validation and accreditation to convince
audiences on the benefits of using co-simulation in complex settings of critical infrastructures.
The set of data-related attacks surveyed here focused on meter data and energy bidding in dynamic markets. Another
common aspect to study when incorporating networking into co-simulations is modeling DoS/DDoS. We observed the
use of toolchains and auxiliary tools to drive simulations as several results have used third-party software. Finally, some
studies have tackled synchronized interventions (both unintended and malicious), and the effects on electricity prices
and on energy related decisions by managers.
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Group S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16
A. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
B. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
C. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
D. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
E. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
F. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
G1. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
G2. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
G3. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
G4. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
G5. ✓ ✓ ✓
G6. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
G7. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




S03—System administrators S11—SCADA operators (focus: EMS)
S04—NIDS researchers S12—Domain experts (SG related)
S05—Network administrators S13—Control Centre Operator
S06—Network administrators (focus: topology) S14—DSO
S07—Utility companies (and ESCO) S15—DSO (focus: market and pricing)
S08—Utility companies (focus: DR) S16—Multiple (eg, survey)
T A B L E 3 Major
stakeholders according to feature
group
Figure 2 shows modeling choices in SG and open-source frameworks. It is noticeable that many tools are required in
conjunction for a comprehensive analysis depending on the modeling objective. It also shows where security officers may
direct their attention for integrity and availability analysis (they correspond to boxes in red in the figure).
Cyber-physical security may address uncertainty and adverse conditions in weather affecting power generation, stor-
age (batteries), physical attacks and delays in CPS and IoT as well as synchronizing incursions in appliances working at the
same schedule (through malware). The figure shows dependencies among modeling possibilities, for example, to model
embedded generation, or “behind the meter generation,” one should consider the weather aspects that may influence
renewable power provision.
Figure 3 presents a summary of findings in the SLR. There is significant use of free and open-source as well as propri-
etary frameworks and a preference for using open-source networking solutions (eg, ns-2, ns-3, and INET). It shows the
major topics found in the SLR for co-simulation of CPS where targets were SCADA components, power generators, mar-
ket, and ICT. Few results have tackled confidentiality due to difficulties in modeling these aspects in a realistic manner
(one models the consequence of breaching systems, that is, what happens after these occurrences).
4 CONCLUSION
Over time, interaction, design, implementation, evaluation, monitoring, and maintenance of CPS will only increase their
relevance. As these systems are physically deployed, customers and managers must ensure their trustworthiness (security,
privacy, safety, reliability, and resilience). It is thus essential to conduct thorough and timely cyber-physical security
analysis when addressing critical infrastructures.
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F I G U R E 2 Modeling possibilities in SG contexts with respect to security and open-source frameworks
The state space size needed to model a set of interacting CPS makes formal approaches impractical. That is the main
reason why co-simulation approaches emerge as mechanisms to tackle difficulties in CPS settings. These techniques could
be used before physical deployment where modelers and analysts can test configurations and make decisions involving
cost-benefit trade-offs. Simulation allows multiple scenario creation by altering parameters and evaluating the impact of
each one on selected metrics of interest.
Many existing co-simulation frameworks and solutions are built for modeling general-purpose behaviors. Model-
ers may employ the tools to consider a number of concerns, not specifically security. That is one of the reasons as to
why we selected 15 papers and extracted a total of 113 features closely related to cyber-physical security, grouping by
their characteristics. We have then commented and discussed those features, identifying targets, attacks, and adversarial
behaviors.
These protective measures and issues in coupled power and telecommunication networks encompassing complex
infrastructures have become high profile in research. The reasons behind cyber-physical security incidents vary, and man-
agers must be prepared for their occurrence. Analysts must also understand how to cope with dynamic attacker behaviors
and harmful approaches emerging in CPS as adversaries change strategies and adapt to grid responses. They could use
co-simulation and modeling features in frameworks as a meaningful mechanism to understand the consequences of
attacks and direct efforts toward detection and mitigation. They could also employ measures to guide design decisions
pointing out bottlenecks or improper resource allocation before physical implementation. In a co-simulation, one could
model uncertainty by incorporating randomness into the parameters, which could be of value for better evaluations and
predictions.
Finally, we have highlighted the importance of vulnerability assessment from authoritative bodies when performing
cyber-physical security evaluations in CPS. Targeting weaknesses in the infrastructure may better inform managers as
to the most susceptible regions that could be targeted by adversaries. As future work, we aim to extend the SLR and
investigate other characteristics of co-simulators where security is also a concern. For example, we may address attacks
toward the transactive market to address effective ways for mitigating malicious incursions.
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F I G U R E 3 Summary of findings in the SLR addressing frameworks, targets, and security dimension
4.1 Challenges and future research directions
As discussed in the seminal paper of Nicol et al,77 in dependability and security simulation one models the consequence
of attacks. In modeling and simulation, a common theme is directed on addressing integrity (physical attacks in power
or communication lines or servers) as well as availability (delays caused by spurious packet injection, jamming, or other
incursions). In the SG, adversaries may employ a wide range of strategies to compromise devices and modelers have a
large attack surface to consider and evaluate different scopes. For instance, they could want to investigate how latency is
affected or what happens if a server or measurement station gets disconnected and how the infrastructure components
react.
We list future challenges to address in modeling and co-simulation with ramifications in the security of the SG:
1. Realism: improvements to represent complex environments that approximate as close as possible the intricacies of
the SG at different levels of detail. These considerations are essential in data-centric environments where multiple CPS
converge to provide services to stakeholders;
2. Market: tools must integrate the energy market into the modeling designs due to the effect on frequency regulation
and the ability to manage small-scale power networks with localized decision making capabilities;
3. Modeling attackers: further efforts to represent adversaries’ behaviors and consequences to infrastructures. Another
concern is to address the propagation and synchronization of high-wattage devices with compromised IoT software78;
4. Coupled systems: further effort to seamlessly integrate modeling of weather, market, buildings, households’
appliances, AMI, EV, power generation devices, telecommunication networks, and mix with adversarial behaviors;
5. Cope with emergent energy resources: it is a challenge to address new DER participating in the network such as
storage (varied capacity), EV (ie, mobile batteries), increased solar/wind penetration, and how prosumers may profit from
incentives;
6. Integrated Transmission and Distribution: co-simulation models will have to consider broader aspects in power
happening on the Transmission level that may include large generators integrated with distribution networks as domestic
customers may add DER to help frequency balancing and market considerations;
7. Effects of telecommunication: analysts must also model how delays and the propagating effects of telecommunication
may influence frequency or power provision under stressful conditions caused by attacks;
8. Improved scenario management: as the number of scenarios increases, co-simulation tools will have to provide
scenario management capabilities to ensure the best analysis options to analysts;
9. Validation: determining whether multiple coupled systems are in fact yielding results that are in close match with
real settings is an important goal. Improving the validation process for such simulations is thus essential;
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10. Performance of simulators: a full co-simulation encompasses the use of many auxiliary simulator engines depend-
ing on the objective. For instance, if one wants to integrate buildings, telecommunication networks and ITD systems, the
software will have to cope with a massive number of computations and synchronization even for reduced time simula-
tions. In cyber-physical security, timely responses are important to contain attacks and quickly devise countermeasures
to cope with malicious incursions;
The modeling possibilities should also consider the consequences of data corruption in generation, storage, or trans-
mission as well as the effects of delays in energy aggregation and dispatch, bidding and near real-time dynamic pricing.
Only a few frameworks discussed here considered the energy market and how adversaries may influence the designs of
TES for increasing protections to suppliers and customers.
Capturing pieces of evidence of attacks (ie, traceability) in simulations to verify how output options could be used
to improve the analysis effort of complex systems. Energy stakeholders must be able to identify customers or attackers
responsible for malicious actions and provide proof for authorities.
Out of the surveyed work, only a few exceptions allowed proper download and installation of the tool (and auxiliary
software and libraries) as well as access to the models. Developers of frameworks and tools must not only ensure timely
execution, but also access to the source code and documentation. This is crucial to enable analysts to validate platforms
and extend models when adapting to particular situations.
For improving frameworks and tools, there is a need to devise templates of topologies so modelers could easily adapt
to their contexts. These systems could allow improved exploratory analysis in complex contexts such as the ones in the
SG. For example, modeling predefined power schemes (test feeders), encompassing mechanisms for scaling up and down
the number of building and households could be interesting for analysis. All those entities are connected altogether and
mapped to the telecommunication networks, with proper Internet addressing, assigned generation units, transformers,
power lines, and other components, from the template. This previously set up power topology is matched with the commu-
nication network, where the modelers’ focus could be directed toward adversaries artificially increasing delay or causing
corruption of data in smart meters.
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